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on Revenues and Congestion
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April 2015
In many service settings, customers have to join the queue without being fully aware of the parameters
of the service provider (for e.g., customers at check-out counters may not know the true service rate prior
to joining). In such “blind queues”, customers make their joining/balking decisions based on the limited
information about the service provider’s operational parameters (from past service experiences, reviews,
etc.), and queue lengths. We analyze a firm serving customers making decisions under arbitrary beliefs about
the service parameters in an observable queue for a service with known price.
We propose an ordering for the balking threshold distributions in customer population, which allows for
comparing the effects of customer beliefs on the queue. We show that while revealing the service information
to customers improves revenues under certain conditions, it may however destroy consumer welfare or social
welfare. Given a market size, the consumer welfare can be significantly reduced when a fast server announces
its true service parameter. When revenue is higher under some beliefs, one would expect the congestion to
also be higher because more customers join, but we show the congestion may not necessarily increase.
Key words : Customer Decisions, Lack of Information, Service Revelation, Customer Beliefs, Queueing.
1. Introduction
Almost all the literature on queues assumes that the service parameters are common knowledge and
fully known to customers when making their decisions. In reality, it is likely that only the service
firm knows its capacity and the customers may not be fully informed of the service capacity. It is
even possible that customers could be systematically misinformed about a firm’s service capacity.
Hence, it is important to understand if the firm is motivated to reveal its private information on
service rate to the customers, and if the firm does reveal the information, whether the information
would increase consumer welfare or firm revenues. To be sure, there are papers that have focused
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on firms announcing (real-time) delay information in terms of queue and waiting time information
to its customers. However, those models also generally assume that the firm’s service parameters
are known to the customers.
We expect that customers that have had limited past interactions with the service provider will
not be able to accurately predict its true service rate. For instance, a customer might have visited
a restaurant or an amusement park only once or twice, and it is conceivable that her best estimate
of the service capacity will be based on the service times she had experienced (in the absence
of other inputs). In some cases, customers might augment their information using feedback from
external acquaintances, but even such information is likely to be a smaller sample than what is
needed to know the full service distribution (which is often assumed to be known accurately in the
literature). In line with many real-life services, but in contrast to the existing literature, we allow
for the customers to not know the service parameter accurately, unless they are informed about it
by the firm. We term such queues as blind queues.
Our approach to the analysis is general, i.e., individual customers can have arbitrarily different
beliefs about the service rate. It might be possible that the population is correct on average but
individual customers may be idiosyncratically misinformed. We also consider the possibility that
the population as a whole is mis-informed systematically. In our model, queue joining (or balking)
decision is irrevocable. Thus, we do not consider reneging behavior, that may result from in-queue
learning. However, it is possible that the in-queue learning accrued during past experiences or
out-of-queue learning form the customer beliefs in our model that drive joining or balking.
In observable queues, when customers arrive with different beliefs about the true service rate,
they exhibit different balking behaviors due to their beliefs. For instance, a customer may join the
queue when he is better off with a balking decision (if he overestimates the true service rate), and
conversely, a misinformed customer may balk from the queue when he should not.
Note that customers’ internal beliefs about the service rate are not observable; the server only
observes customers’ joining/balking decisions. Hence, we work primarily with the observable balk-
ing threshold distribution that results from the original service-rate belief distribution, but address
the relationship between the distributions at the end of our main analysis. There is some recent
empirical evidence (see Lu et al. (2013) that uses queueing data from a Deli), supporting the
approach that customers in observable queues may rely primarily on the length of the queue to
make their purchasing/joining decisions. Thus, by understanding the impact of balking thresholds
on system performance, our results could be further implemented to models where service values
and waiting costs are heterogeneous.
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1.1. Related Literature
The literature on queueing models with strategic customers dates back to the seminal paper of Naor
(1969), who studies a single-server system with an observable queue. In Naor’s model, homogeneous
customers (who know the service parameters) observe the queue length upon arrival before making
a decision to join the system. Because of homogeneity, customers have identical balking thresholds.
In our paper, customers are not aware of the true service parameters. We allow them to have arbi-
trarily distributed heterogeneous beliefs over the service rate. Thus, our work is also closely related
to the classical queueing papers with heterogeneous customers (with full information), in addition
to those papers that examine the effect of delay announcements. Following Naor (1969), queues
with heterogeneous service values and time costs have been studied, as seen in the comprehensive
review by Hassin and Haviv (2003).
There is a large volume of literature that examines the provision of fixed or variable delay
information (i.e. queue length or real-time waiting time, etc.) to arriving customers. In the context
of call-centers, there are several papers that study the provision of current delay information. For
instance, see Armony and Maglaras (2004a,b) and Jouini et al. (2011). We refer the reader to an
excellent review by Aks¸in et al. (2007) of the call center literature, on the role of delay information
on customers’ balking behavior. Nevertheless, the service capacity and arrival information is often
assumed to be known to all customers in these papers.
Hassin (1986) considers a revenue-maximizing server who may hide queue lengths to improve
revenue. Whitt (1999) shows that customers are more likely to be blocked in a system where the
delay information is not provided to a system where it is provided. Guo and Zipkin (2007) studies
an M/M/1 queue extension with three modes of information: no information, partial information
(the queue length) and full information (the exact waiting time). Economou and Kanta (2008) and
Guo and Zipkin (2009) study models where some partitioned queue information (such as range of
queue-lengths) is available to customers to make their decisions. However, in all the aforementioned
papers (including the no-information, unobservable queues first studied in Edelson and Hildebrand
(1975)), the customers are aware of the service rate parameters.
Thus, there are very few papers that treat service information as a firm’s private information
about which customers are either not informed or have incorrect beliefs. Besbes et al. (2011) and
Debo and Veeraraghavan (2014) analyze customers’ equilibrium joining behaviors in queues with
limited information on service rate. In Hassin (2007), the true service rate is either fast or slow.
While the probabilities of the service rate being fast or slow is known to customers, the server
can choose to reveal or not to reveal the realized rate. In Guo et al. (2011), partial distributional
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information is conveyed to the customers, who then employ the max-entropy distribution in decid-
ing whether to join or balk from the queues. In these papers, individual customers have correct
distributional information over the service rate.
In contrast, we do not impose any such condition, i.e., individual customers could have incorrect
information, and we study the impact of announcing service information in such cases. To the best
of our knowledge, there does not exist any prior literature on customer decisions when they do not
have any information about the service parameters.
Finally, our approach complements the perspective in Besbes and Maglaras (2009) and Haviv and
Randhawa (2014), where the service firm does not fully know the demand (volume) information.
Instead, we study a system where customers do not know a firm’s service information. We focus
only on the decision whether the firm should reveal the unknown information to the customers.
The main theoretical contributions of our paper can be summarized as follows:
1. Customers may have arbitrary balking thresholds due to their beliefs and decision frameworks.
We characterize those balking threshold distributions under which the firm will gain revenues from
revealing its service information.
2. We propose an order for customer balking threshold distributions, and show as they become
less dispersed in the population, the firm improves its revenues. When the customer population
systematically underestimates the service capacity, the resulting balking threshold distribution
tends to be pessimistically biased, and the service provider should always reveal its service rate
information in that case.
3. When revenue is higher under some balking threshold distributions, one would expect the
congestion to also be higher because more customers join, but we show that this is not always true
by providing counter-examples.
4. The welfare effects of information revealing are mixed. System congestion (both queue lengths
and wait times) can increase with information revelation. Individual consumer welfare thus can
worsen with more information, especially when a firm with high service rate releases its information.
Social welfare may also fall with more information, because the improvement in revenues may be
insufficient to overcome the consumer welfare loss.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and characterizes the
system performance in terms of balking threshold distributions. In Section 3, we analyze customer
populations with different distributions. In Section 4, we investigate the impact of the revelation
of service information on revenues, system congestion, and welfare. Section 5, concludes the paper
and addresses some future research directions. All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
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2. Model
We focus on a single-server queueing system. (All results extend to a multi-server system.) Cus-
tomers arrive to the queue according to a Poisson process at rate λ> 0 per unit time. The service
time at the server is exponentially distributed with service rate µ > λ. Let ρ , λ/µ < 1 denote
the traffic intensity. Arriving customers line up at the server if the server is busy, and the queue
discipline is first-come first-served (FCFS). Every arriving customer observes the number of the
customers already waiting in the system before making an irrevocable join or balk decision (i.e,
there is no reneging). On joining, all customers incur a linear waiting cost of c per unit time when
they wait. The server provides a service of value v. Thus, all customers are homogeneous in their
service valuation and in their waiting costs. The firm charges an exogenous price p for its service.
Upon arrival, the customers decide whether to join the queue based on the net value they expect
to receive from the service (i.e., v − p) and their expected waiting cost. Suppose the customers
knew the true service rate µ. Then, a customer arriving when there are n customers already in the
system, would join the queue when v − p− (n+ 1)c/µ ≥ 0, or balk otherwise. This is the model
described in Naor (1969).
Model of Customer (mis-)Information: In contrast to the existing literature, we relax the
assumption that customers are aware of the service time distribution or the service rate. We posit
that customers quite often will not have complete information on the true distribution. For instance,
customers with limited or idiosyncratic past interactions with the server, may have widely varying
service rate beliefs.
In this paper, we use the superscript ˜ (tilde) to describe customer beliefs and the resulting
distributions. Customers may have heterogeneous beliefs on the service rate, and their beliefs could
differ arbitrarily from the true service rate µ. We denote customer service rate beliefs by µ˜∈ (0,M)
for some large M , with some cumulative distribution function (cdf) Gµ˜ across the entire population.
Note that every customer has a deterministic belief. The beliefs form a random distribution because
customers with different beliefs arrive to the system randomly.
Now, we discuss bias using beliefs on the true service rate µ as an example. If the mean of
the random variable, µ˜, is equal to µ, i.e., the service rate belief of the population is “correct”
on average, we describe the service rate beliefs of the population as being consistent. If the mean
of µ˜ is not µ, we address the service rate beliefs as being biased. Specifically, if the population
mean is greater (less) than the true µ, the service rate beliefs are optimistic (pessimistic), i.e., the
population is on average optimistic (pessimistic) on the speed of the server.
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Upon arrival, a customer with belief µ˜ who observes n customers currently waiting in the system
(including the person who is under the service, if any) makes the following decision:{
v− p≥ (n+1)c
µ˜
: The customer joins the queue;
otherwise: The customer balks from the queue.
Throughout the paper, we will assume v−p≥ c
µ˜
a.s. to eliminate trivial outcomes and ensure that
customers will join an empty queue.
Balking Threshold Distribution: Define N˜ , b µ˜(v−p)
c
c, i.e., N˜ is an integer such that N˜ ≤
µ˜(v−p)
c
< N˜ +1. Intuitively, N˜ describes the balking threshold for a customer with service rate belief
µ˜: the customer who arrives to see n customers waiting in the system will join if n+1≤ N˜ and balk
otherwise. Each customer has a deterministic balking threshold as a result of her (internally-held)
service rate belief, and will make a deterministic decision upon seeing the queue length.
Let FN˜ be the cdf that characterizes the random variable N˜ . The balking thresholds are random
because customers appear at random at the queue. Note that customers’ beliefs on the service rate
are drawn from some distribution Gµ˜ which can be continuous, whereas the balking thresholds are
drawn from a discrete distribution FN˜(n) = Pr[N˜ ≤ n]. Since v− p≥ cµ˜ , we have N˜ ∈ {1,2, . . .}. In
essence, we translate the customer beliefs on service rate to actions dictated by discrete balking
thresholds. For notational convenience, we suppress the subscript N˜ in FN˜ and denote FN˜ simply
as F wherever unambiguous.
Note that the server only observes customers’ joining/balking decisions, but not their service
rate beliefs. Hence, we will directly analyze the balking threshold distribution N˜ . Our terminology
on biases in service rate beliefs (pessimism, optimism and consistency) also appropriately applies
to balking threshold distributions. However, due to the floor function in the mapping from µ˜ to N˜ ,
the biases in service rate beliefs mostly follow the same direction as the biases in the corresponding
balking threshold distribution, but not always. We will discuss the sufficient conditions in §4.
System Evolution under Balking Threshold Distribution: We have a population comprising
of customers who are heterogeneous in their joining behavior due to the varying individual balking
thresholds. Since N˜ ∈ {1,2, . . .}, we have a queuing system with state-dependent arrivals - a system
whose buffer size equal to the maximum balking threshold. In contrast, note that when customers
fully know µ, we get the classical M/M/1/N system with state-independent arrivals that emerges
in Naor (1969) where N , bµ(v−p)
c
c. Note that the system with heterogeneity in N˜ which emerges
from µ˜ is similar in system evolution to a system with heterogeneity in v or c (see Hassin and
Haviv (2003), pp. 34–36).
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Let the state of system be denoted by i where i is the number of customers in the system
(including the customer at the server). Since λ< µ, this queueing system is recurrent, and long-run
steady state probabilities exist. Let pii denote the long-run probability that the system is in state
i. Now consider state i: among all arrivals, only those customers who have the balking threshold
greater than or equal to i+ 1 will join the queue. Thus, the effective joining probability at state
i is given by Pr[N˜ ≥ i+ 1] = Pr[N˜ > i] = F¯ (i) (by letting F¯N˜(·) = 1−FN˜(·)). The effective arrival
rate at any state i is λF¯ (i).
From the steady state rate balance equations, we have pii+1 = ρF¯ (i)pii for i ∈ {0,1,2, ...}, which
gives pii = ρ
ipi0
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n) for i∈ {1,2,3, ...}. Since ρ< 1, it follows from
∞∑
i=0
pii = 1 that
pi0 = 1
/(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
)
. (1)
The average number of customers in the system, denoted by L, is given by
L=
∞∑
i=0
ipii =
∞∑
i=1
ipii = pi0
∞∑
i=1
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n) =
∞∑
i=1
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
/(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
)
. (2)
By convention, we set all the empty products to 1. For instance,
−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n) = 1. Then,
L=
∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
/( ∞∑
i=0
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
)
. (3)
The long-run revenue rate at the server, denoted by R, is given by pµ(1− pi0), e.g., see Larsen
(1998). It follows that the long-run effective arrival rate at the system, denoted by λeff , is:
λeff = µ(1−pi0)<λ. (4)
Finally, let W denote the average time a customer spends in the system, i.e, her waiting time in
the queue plus her service time. By Little’s Law,
W =
L
λeff
=
pi0
∞∑
i=1
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
µ(1−pi0) (from conditions (2) and (4)) =
1
µ
pi0
1−pi0
∞∑
i=1
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n). (5)
Now recall from (1) that pi0 = 1
/(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
)
, hence, pi0
1−pi0 = 1
/( ∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
)
.
Plugging in (5), we have
W =
∞∑
i=1
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
/(
µ
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯ (n)
)
. (6)
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Thus, as long as we can characterize the balking threshold distribution N˜ , we can derive the
performance measures for the queueing system through its cdf F . This allows us to compare any
two systems with populations that differ in their balking threshold distributions. To this end, in
the next section, we set up a sequence of systems with balking threshold distributions that are
stochastically ordered in some sense.
3. Balking Thresholds under the Lack of Service Information
When µ is fully known to customers, the balking threshold distribution is a one-point distribu-
tion (i.e., all customers have the same balking threshold). In contrast, the balking thresholds are
distributed arbitrarily when customers are not informed. Recall that when there is optimism (pes-
simism) bias, the average balking threshold is higher (lower) than the true threshold. In §3.1, we
consider balking threshold belief distributions that have bias. In §3.2, we compare populations
whose average balking threshold is accurate, but there is arbitrary variability on the individual
thresholds. Our analysis assists us in pinning down the performance differences among queueing
systems that differ in customer beliefs.
3.1. Population with Biased Balking Threshold Distribution
We first compare systems under balking threshold distributions N˜ and N˜ ′ that differ in their mean.
Definition 1. First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD): (Quirk and Saposnik 1962) Let F
and G be the cdf’s of random variables X and Y . X is said to be smaller than Y with respect
to the first-order stochastic order (written X ≤st Y ) if F(t)≥G(t) for all real t, or equivalently, if
F¯(t)≤ G¯(t) for all real t.
FOSD relation is also termed as usual stochastic order by Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002), and fre-
quently called the stochastic order. It is well known that variables ordered by FOSD have different
means (e.g., see Theorem 1.2.9/(a) in Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002)). Through FOSD relation, we can
compare two balking threshold distributions with respect to their ‘biases’. Essentially, pessimistic
balking threshold distributions are stochastically dominated by more optimistic distributions.
We use λeff,N˜ ,RN˜ , LN˜ , WN˜ to denote the long-run effective arrival (rate), the long-run revenue
(rate) at the firm, the average number of customers and the average time a customer spends in
the system when the balking threshold distribution of the population is characterized by N˜ . The
following Theorem 1 compares the performance metrics of two systems under balking threshold
distributions ordered by FOSD.
Theorem 1. If N˜ ≤st N˜ ′, then (i) λeff,N˜ ≤ λeff,N˜ ′ (RN˜ ≤RN˜ ′); (ii) LN˜ ≤LN˜ ′; (iii) WN˜ ≤WN˜ ′.
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Proof of Theorem 1 follows directly by comparing the stochastics of two queues, and by taking
expectations of the distribution of the corresponding performance metrics (e.g., see Theorem 1
in Bhaskaran (1986)). Also see Berger and Whitt (1992) which compares two queues each with a
single balking threshold. In our model, there are multiple balking thresholds in the same queue
depending on the individual customer beliefs.
Theorem 1 states that if customers become more patient (higher balking thresholds), the firm
serves more customers and receives higher revenue, at the same time incurring a higher system
congestion. Note that the results are distribution-free, i.e., the performance metrics of queues can
be ordered for any balking threshold distribution, as long as the underlying distributions can be
(first-order) stochastically ordered. Thus, the ordering includes the distribution in which customers
all share some common randomly drawn belief (and the corresponding balking threshold). Also,
note that the ordering of performance metrics is invariant to the true service rate of the system.
3.2. Population with Consistent Balking Threshold Distribution
In this section, we consider mean-preserving spreads to examine balking threshold distributions
that have the same mean as the “true” balking threshold, but differ in how the individual balking
thresholds are distributed. If all customers knew the service rate exactly, then every customer uses
the same “true” balking threshold N , which is a special consistent distribution. We use the notion
of Single Mean Preserving Spread to order balking threshold distributions that are consistent.
Definition 2. Single Mean Preserving Spread (SMPS): (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) Let F
and G be the cdf’s of two discrete random variables X and Y whose common support is a sequence
of real numbers a1 <a2 < ... < an. Suppose the probability mass functions f and g describe X and
Y completely: Pr(X = ai) = fi and Pr(Y = ai) = gi where
n∑
i=1
fi =
n∑
i=1
gi = 1. Suppose fi = gi for all
but four i, say i1, i2, i3 and i4 where ik < ik+1. Define γik = gik − fik . Then we say that Y differs
from X by a single Mean Preserving Spread (written F ≤SMPS G) if γi1 =−γi2 ≥ 0, γi4 =−γi3 ≥ 0
and
4∑
k=i
aikγik = 0.
The notion of mean preserving spread (MPS) is often employed to model risk ordering of two
random variables that may have the same mean but different variability. If two distributions F and
G describe the returns of two risky investments, and F ≤MPS G, then distribution F is considered
less risky. SMPS in Definition 2 is a stricter condition than MPS: F ≤SMPS G ⇒F ≤MPS G.
Consider consistent balking threshold distribution N˜ , i.e., E[N˜ ] equals the balking threshold
N (when the service parameters are fully known to the customers). We seek to compare the
performance metrics under N˜ to the metrics if the true parameters of the system were known.
To that end, we create a sequence of random variables ordered by SMPS that begin at an initial
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distribution. Using a fairly general, but intuitive construction technique, we will show that the
sequence (generated using our construction) will terminate at a specific “final” distribution within
finite number of steps, regardless of the initial distribution. We then characterize an ordering of the
performance metrics for the entire sequence. This not only allows us to compare the performance
under the initial distribution to the canonical system with fully informed customers, but also
facilitates a comparison between any two arbitrary (consistent) balking threshold distributions.
Let our initial balking thresholds be characterized by some random variable N˜0. In Construction
1, we will create a sequence of random variables {N˜K}K≥0 (the K-th term in the sequence is
distributed with the cdf FK), and discuss the properties of the sequence. The cdf FK has support
over some finite sequence of natural numbers aK1 < aK2 < ... < aKn . We denote fK its probability
mass function (pmf) such that fK(aKi)> 0 for i∈ {1,2, ..., n} and
n∑
i=1
fK(aKi) = 1.
Consider the transformation of N˜K to N˜K+1 in the following Construction 1. The succeeding
random variable in the sequence, N˜K+1, is constructed from the preceding random variable N˜K by
taking an equal probability mass from both ends of the distribution FK and adding those weights
towards the “middle” of the support.
Construction 1.
When aKn − 1>aK1 + 1,

fK+1(aK1) = fK(aK1)−min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
fK+1(aK1 + 1) = fK(aK1 + 1) + min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
fK+1(x) = fK(x) ∀ x∈ {aK1 + 2, aK1 + 3, ..., aKn − 2}
fK+1(aKn − 1) = fK(aKn − 1) + min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
fK+1(aKn) = fK(aKn)−min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
fK+1 = 0 otherwise.
When aKn − 1 = aK1 + 1,

fK+1(aK1) = fK(aK1)−min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
fK+1(aK1 + 1) = fK(aK1 + 1) + 2min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
fK+1(aKn) = fK(aKn)−min{fK(aKK1 ), fK(aKn)}
fK+1 = 0 otherwise.
Stop the sequence when N˜T is such that aTn − 1<aT1 + 1.
Numerical Illustration 1: We illustrate Construction 1 with an example. Consider a random
variable N˜K ∈ {3,4,5,7,9}, with pmf fK(x) = {0.1,0.3,0.2,0.1,0.3} for x = {3,4,5,7,9} respec-
tively. To form N˜K+1, Construction 1 requires 0.1 = min{0.1,0.3} of the probability mass at the
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“ends” of the support to be re-allocated towards the “middle”, i.e., from “3” to “4”, and also
from “9” to “8”. This results in N˜K+1 ∈ {4,5,7,8,9}, with pmf fK+1(x) = {0.4,0.2,0.1,0.1,0.2} for
x= {4,5,7,8,9}. In the next step, applying the transformation from Construction 1 would lead to
N˜K+2 ∈ {4,5,7,8}, with pmf fK+2(x) = {0.2,0.4,0.1,0.3} for x= {4,5,7,8}.
With Construction 1, we create the sequence {N˜0, N˜1, . . . , N˜T}, beginning from an initial balking
threshold distribution N˜0, with the corresponding cdf’s {F0,F1, . . . ,FT}. Thus, we have a sequence
of random variables that describe customer balking thresholds that are ordered in some sense. In
the following Lemma 1, we show that T is finite and the distributions are mean-preserving spreads.
Lemma 1. Consider a sequence {N˜K} from Construction 1. (i) The sequence terminates at some
finite K = T . (ii) FK ≤SMPS FK−1 for K ∈ {1,2, . . . , T}.
Lemma 1 states that all the balking threshold distributions along the sequence built through
Construction 1 have the same mean (i.e., they obey the mean preserving property). As long as
the first balking threshold distribution is consistent, all the distributions in Construction 1 will
be consistent. Furthermore, every succeeding distribution in the sequence is dominated (under the
SMPS criterion) by the preceding distribution, i.e., every distribution in the sequence is followed
by another distribution that has a lower “spread”.
We now show in Lemma 2, for all initial balking threshold distributions that have the same
mean, the sequence always terminates at the same distribution N˜T . Depending on the parameters
of the initial distribution (support etc.), the number of steps taken to reach N˜T may differ. Thus,
T depends on the initial distribution, but N˜T does not.
Lemma 2. Given any N˜0, the sequence {FK} terminates at the same FT with the random variable
N˜T ∈ {bE(N˜0)c, dE(N˜0)e} such that E(N˜T ) =E(N˜0).
Now that we have a sequence of random variables ordered SMPS by Construction 1, we can
compare the performance metrics of the queueing system under different balking threshold distri-
butions along the sequence. Using our notation introduced earlier, we denote λeff,N˜K ,RN˜K , LN˜K
and WN˜K the effective arrival, the firm revenue, the average queue length, and the average waiting
time, corresponding to N˜K in the sequence of distributions {N˜K}K≥0.
Lemma 3. Let {N˜K} be any sequence from Construction 1. (i) λeff,N˜K < λeff,N˜K+1 (RN˜K <
RN˜K+1) for all ρ; (ii) If ρ ≤ 12
(√
(
aKn
aKn−1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn−1
)
, then LN˜K < LN˜K+1; and (iii) If ρ ≤
1
2
(√
(
aKn−1
aKn−2
)2 + 4− aKn−1
aKn−2
)
, then WN˜K <WN˜K+1.
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Recall that Construction 1 builds a sequence of balking threshold distributions with decreasing
spreads, while maintaining consistency (i.e., identical means). It follows from Lemma 3/(i) that,
regardless of the traffic in the system, the revenues at the firm improve as the customers’ balking
thresholds become less spread-out (or narrower). This result is not due to Jensen’s inequality.1
Revenue improvements along the sequence emerge from the following two mechanisms: (i) The
customer balking thresholds are gradually altered along the sequence in the construction which
changes the long-run probabilities for all states. (ii) Along the construction path, the balking
threshold increases for some customers, and decreases for some others. We prove that the through-
put/revenue from increased joining of the customers with improved balking thresholds, compensates
for the decreased joining of those customers with reduced balking thresholds. This is proven for
any prior belief distribution.
Lemma 3/(ii) and (iii) provide distribution-free sufficient conditions for LN˜K < LN˜K+1 and
WN˜K < WN˜K+1 , respectively. It is possible to derive stronger distribution-specific conditions for
each inequality. Unlike the revenues, which always increase as the balking thresholds become less
spread-out, the expected queue lengths and/or the expected waiting times can increase or decrease.
We provide numerical examples below to support this observation.
Numerical Illustration 2: We explore the performance metrics as the balking threshold distri-
bution N˜K is transformed into N˜K+1 according to Construction 1. Since λeff,N˜K <λeff,N˜K+1 (from
Lemma 3/(i)), following Little’s Law, it is impossible to have LN˜K > LN˜K+1 and WN˜K <WN˜K+1
at the same time. All three other cases are possible: (i) LN˜K < LN˜K+1 and WN˜K < WN˜K+1 , (ii)
LN˜K <LN˜K+1 and WN˜K >WN˜K+1 , and, (iii) LN˜K >LN˜K+1 and WN˜K >WN˜K+1 .
For example, consider the random variable N˜K ∈ {3,4,5}, such that its pmf fK(x) = {0.2,0.6,0.2}
for x= {3,4,5} respectively. Following Construction 1, we have N˜K+1 such that Pr(N˜K+1 = 4) = 1,
which is also the last step. Let µ= 1 in all cases below.
Case (i): When ρ = 0.4, LN˜K = 0.609 < LN˜K+1 = 0.615 and WN˜K = 1.551 < WN˜K+1 = 1.562.
(λeff,N˜K = 0.392<λeff,N˜K+1 = 0.394.)
Case (ii): When ρ = 0.825, LN˜K = 1.617 < LN˜K+1 = 1.621 and WN˜K = 2.265 > WN˜K+1 = 2.262.
(λeff,N˜K = 0.714<λeff,N˜K+1 = 0.717.)
1 Consider a distribution N˜0 with cdf F0, pmf f0 and some integer mean E(N˜0). Jensen’s inequality would imply
RE(N˜0) >
∞∑
n=0
f0(n)Rn where RE(N˜0) and Rn are revenues when all customers use the balking threshold E(N˜0) and n
respectively. Lemma 3 states that RE(N˜0) >RN˜0 = pµ(1− pi0) where pi0 = 1
/(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯0(n)
)
(from Equation
(1)) which is not related to
∞∑
n=0
f0(n)Rn.
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Case (iii): When ρ = 0.9, LN˜K = 1.793 > LN˜K+1 = 1.790 and WN˜K = 2.380 > WN˜K+1 = 2.368.
(λeff,N˜K = 0.753<λeff,N˜K+1 = 0.756.)
When revenue/throughput is higher under some change in balking threshold distribution, one
would expect the congestion to also be higher because more customers join. However, we find
scenarios in which revenue/throughput increases while congestion decreases. According to Lemma
3/(ii) and (iii), this occurs only when traffic is sufficiently large (i.e., large enough ρ). Theorem 2
formalizes this observation.
Having illustrated the comparative statics for the sequence of distributions in Lemma 3, we can
now compare the performance metrics of (any) initial distribution with the terminal distribution.
This is captured in Theorem 2. It turns out that when customers’ balking thresholds become less
spread-out, the firm always improves its revenues. On the other hand, customers have to wait
longer on average, if the traffic is smaller than some threshold level.
Theorem 2. Let N˜ be any balking threshold distribution and N˜T be the last term from Con-
struction 1 initiated at N˜0 = N˜ . Then, (i) λeff,N˜ < λeff,N˜T (RN˜ < RN˜T ) for all ρ; (ii) ∃ ρL s.t.
LN˜ <LN˜T ∀ ρ≤ ρL; and (iii) ∃ ρW s.t. WN˜ <WN˜T ∀ ρ≤ ρW .
Theorem 2 indicates that revenue at the server always improves when balking thresholds become
less spread-out. Essentially, some customers with high balking threshold become less patient, and
some others with low balking thresholds become more patient. Due to PASTA property, the system
occupancy when customers arrive is more likely to be low (recall ρ < 1). As a result, there is
increased joining of customers leading to higher revenues.
The effect on congestion and waiting times depends on the traffic ρ. When the traffic intensity ρ
is small, balking thresholds that are less spread-out can increase congestion (L or W ). This could
be understood through externalities imposed by joining/balking customers.
At low queue-lengths, more customers join (as balking thresholds become less spread-out) caus-
ing increased negative externalities for future arrivals. At high queue-lengths, less customers join
decreasing the negative externalities at those states. The net effect of the negative extenalities
imposed depends on the likelihood of the low queues lengths to high queue lengths.
When ρ is small, the queue mostly resides at low states and visits higher states less often. Thus
when ρ is small, the increased negative externalities imposed by customers joining at low states
exceed any benefit from reduced negative externalities at high states. As a result, the expected
wait times and queue lengths are higher when the beliefs are less spread-out.
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When ρ is large, the higher states are relatively more likely to be visited (as opposed to when ρ
is small). Thus, it is possible that the benefits accrued at higher states can overcome the negative
externalities imposed at lower states. For instance, see Cases (ii) and (iii) of Numerical Illustration
2. Thus, in low traffic, as balking thresholds become more accurate, customers wait longer and
suffer higher disutility. This result is intriguing because serving the same population, a faster server
announcing its true service rate is more likely to result in welfare loss due to increased congestion.
Lower Bounds: We can use the analytical properties of the bounds along the sequence to derive
distribution-free bounds (with respect to N˜) on ρL and ρW that hold for any arbitrary customer
balking threshold distribution. The lower bounds ρ
L
and ρ
W
are such that ρL ≥ ρL = 0.5 and
ρW ≥ ρW = 0.414 respectively. We defer the details of the derivation to the appendix.
4. Impact of Revealing Service Information
We now calibrate the impact of a firm revealing its true service rate µ, by comparing revenues and
system congestion under two balking threshold distributions corresponding to the case when the
firm reveals or does not reveal its service information.
When customers are uninformed, they may have arbitrary beliefs µ˜ over the service rate, and the
balking thresholds are distributed according to N˜ = b µ˜(v−p)
c
c. When the firm reveals its true service
rate, all customers will follow the same true balking threshold N = bµ(v−p)
c
c. Since the threshold
distributions (that emerge from arbitrary beliefs) could be arbitrary, it is unclear when a firm
should reveal its service rate. We examine this question in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When E(N˜)≤N , the firm’s revenue increases on revealing service information
(i.e., R ↑). In addition, when traffic ρ is small, the average queue length and the average customer
waiting time in the system both increase on revelation (L,W ↑).
From the Proposition, we find that when customer balking distributions are pessimistic or even
consistent, i.e., E(N˜)≤N , it is always in the firm’s interest to reveal its service rate as its through-
put and revenues improve. Yet, when ρ is small, the system congestion (the average queue length
and the average customer waiting time) also increases on customers knowing the true information.
To intuit the result, consider a population with balking threshold distribution N˜ . Let
{N˜0, N˜1, . . . , N˜T} be a sequence of balking threshold distributions from Construction 1 starting
with N˜0 = N˜ . Theorem 2 states that R ↑ and L,W ↑ (for small ρ) when customers adopt N˜T instead
of N˜ . Now suppose the balking thresholds are pessimistic or consistent, i.e., E(N˜) ≤ N , it then
follows that N˜T ≤stN . So by Theorem 1, upon revealing, we have R ↑ and L,W ↑. Thus, combining
Theorems 1 and 2, when E(N˜)≤N , we have R ↑ and L,W ↑ (for small ρ).
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Now suppose that customer balking thresholds have optimism bias (N < E(N˜)). Again, we
construct the sequence {N˜0, N˜1, . . . , N˜T} using Construction 1 starting with N˜0 = N˜ . We have
RN˜ < RN˜1 < . . . < RN˜T by Theorem 2. On the other hand, N < E(N˜) implies N <st N˜T , so by
Theorem 1 we have RN < RN˜T . Depending on N˜ , we may have RN < RN˜ or RN > RN˜ . Recall
that {N˜0, N˜1, . . . , N˜T} is a sequence of distributions that have progressively lower spreads. We can
conclude that when the customer balking thresholds are optimistic, the firm may still reveal its
service information as long as it observes high variance in its distribution. We provide numerical
examples to support this observation in §4.2.
Remark: The results in Proposition 1 are distribution-free and also parameter-free, i.e., it is
sufficient for the firm to only know that the balking threshold distributions are pessimistic or
consistent, before the decision to reveal true information is made. The exact distribution itself does
not influence the decision to reveal information.
4.1. Service Rate Beliefs vs. Balking Thresholds
At this juncture, the reader may note that all our preceding analysis is based on balking thresholds.
In Proposition 1, we have customer pessimism in terms of the balking thresholds rather than the
internally held beliefs on service-rate. Observe that balking thresholds could be estimated econo-
metrically by the service provider, by observing the long-run time averages of balking at different
states. However, the distribution of exact service rate beliefs cannot be elicited by observing the
joining/balking actions, since (infinitely) many service rate beliefs could result in an identical balk-
ing threshold. Suppose the service rate beliefs could be identified. Lemma 4 below characterizes
the correspondence between bias (pessimism/optimism) in service-rate beliefs, to the bias in the
resulting balking threshold distribution.
Lemma 4. For any given service rate belief distribution µ˜ and some true service rate µ, we have
(i) µ≥E(µ˜) + c
v−p ⇒E(N˜)<N ; (ii) µ≤E(µ˜)− cv−p ⇒E(N˜)>N ; and (iii) ∀x∈ (0,1], |E(µ˜)−µ|<
x · c
v−p ⇒ |E(N˜)−N |< 1 +x, especially when E(µ˜) = µ, |E(N˜)−N |< 1.
Lemma 4/(i) indicates that if consumer service belief distribution is sufficiently pessimistic (i.e.,
E(µ˜) ≤ µ− c
v−p), then the corresponding balking threshold distribution will also be pessimistic.
(Proposition 1 applies.) Similarly, from 4/(ii), if consumer belief distribution is sufficiently opti-
mistic (i.e., E(µ˜)≥ µ+ c
v−p), then the balking threshold distribution will also be optimistic. If the
bias in service rate beliefs is sufficiently small (i.e., |E(µ˜)−µ|< c
v−p), the consumer balking thresh-
old distribution may be either slightly pessimistic, slightly optimistic, or consistent, but its bias
|E(N˜ −N)| is strictly bounded as provided in Lemma 4/(iii). In all cases, the difference between
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bias in service rate beliefs and bias in balking thresholds decreases in value of service relative to
the waiting cost (i.e., c
v−p ↓). When cv−p → 0, the difference in biases disappears.
Observing Lemma 4/(iii), it is possible that the “internally-held” service-rate belief distribution is
slightly pessimistic (i.e. µ− c
v−p <E(µ˜)<µ), whereas the resulting balking threshold distribution is
optimistic and vice-versa. We provide numerical examples below to further illustrate the divergence.
Numerical Illustration 3: In both examples below, we assume that the customers are unaware of
the provider’s true service rate, µ, and their service rate beliefs are uniformly distributed over [2,8]
per unit time (the time units for µ or µ˜ omitted henceforth), i.e., µ˜∼U [2,8] with mean E(µ˜) = 5.
Example (i): We set the service value v = $8, price p= $2, and customer linear waiting cost at
c = $4/time unit. As a result, customers’ balking threshold, N˜ = b µ˜(v−p)
c
c = b3µ˜/2c, is a discrete
uniform distribution taking values {3,4, . . . ,11} with mean E(N˜) = 7.
If service rate belief distribution is . . . E(µ˜) = 5 E(N˜) = 7 Balking threshold distribution is . . .
sufficiently pessimistic defined by Lemma 4/(i) µ≥ 5 2
3
⇒N ≥ 8
pessimistic
slightly pessimistic, slightly optimistic
or consistent defined by Lemma 4/(iii)
5 2
3
>µ≥ 5 1
3
⇒N = 8
5 1
3
>µ≥ 4 2
3
⇒N = 7 consistent
4 2
3
>µ> 4 1
3
⇒N = 6
optimistic
sufficiently optimistic defined by Lemma 4/(ii) µ≤ 4 1
3
⇒N ≤ 6
Table 1 Bias in Service Rate Beliefs and Balking Thresholds when µ˜∼U [2,8] and c
v−p =
2
3
.
In Table 1, we illustrate the correspondence between the service rate belief distribution and
the balking threshold distribution. We cover the three parts described in Lemma 4 by looking
at various possible value of the “true” service rate µ. Specifically, as stated before, if the service
rate belief distribution is slightly pessimistic, slightly optimistic or consistent, the corresponding
balking threshold distribution can be consistent, (slightly) pessimistic or (slightly) optimistic.
Example (ii): For the second example, we set the service value v= $8, price p= $2, and customer
linear waiting cost at c= $8/time unit. Customers’ balking threshold distribution, N˜ = b µ˜(v−p)
c
c=
b3µ˜/4c, thus takes values {1,2,3,4,5} with mean E(N˜) = 3 2
9
.
If service rate belief distribution is . . . E(µ˜) = 5 E(N˜) = 3 2
9
Balking threshold distribution is . . .
sufficiently pessimistic defined by Lemma 4/(i) µ≥ 6 1
3
⇒N ≥ 4
pessimistic
slightly pessimistic, slightly optimistic
or consistent defined by Lemma 4/(iii)
6 1
3
>µ≥ 5 1
3
⇒N = 4
5 1
3
>µ≥ 4 ⇒N = 3
optimistic4>µ> 3 2
3
⇒N = 2
sufficiently optimistic defined by Lemma 4/(ii) µ≤ 3 2
3
⇒N ≤ 2
Table 2 Bias in Service Rate Beliefs and Balking Thresholds when µ˜∼U [2,8] and c
v−p =
4
3
.
As the value of c
v−p doubles in this example, difference in biases in service rate beliefs and balking
threshold distribution increases. For instance, when µ= 5.25 in Table 2, note that the service rate
beliefs are pessimistic and the resulting threshold distribution is optimistic.
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Remark: Note that the distributional differences between µ˜ and N˜ , are not due to assumptions
in our model, but a direct outcome of discrete join/balk decisions in observable queues. Thus,
revealing the true service rate information, has the same impact as revealing the corresponding
“true” balking threshold information. In other words, differences in biases do not impact our
findings in Proposition 1, as long as the balking threshold distribution is characterized accurately.
4.2. Revenue and Welfare Effects of True Information
We now study the impact of revelation of the service information (or the true balking threshold)
on revenue and welfare by exploring specific cases of M/M/1 queues under different biases. In all
cases, we use the same parameters v, p, c and service rate belief distribution µ˜ as in Example (i) of
Numerical Illustration 3 in §4.1, i.e., µ˜∼U [2,8] and c
v−p =
2
3
.
We examine three scenarios highlighted in the right-most column of Table 1 (Balking threshold
distribution is . . . ) where the resulting threshold N from announcing the true service rate is (i)
greater than, (ii) equal to, or (iii) less than E(N˜). These three instances correspond to (i) µ≥ 5 1
3
,
sufficient or slight pessimism, (ii) µ ∈ [4 2
3
,5 1
3
), slight optimism/slight pessimism/consistent, (iii)
µ < 4 2
3
, sufficient or slight optimism in customer service rate beliefs. For each case, we examine
the firm’s revenue, the average queue length and the average customer waiting time, as well as
consumer welfare and social welfare.
The first line in each table that follows is corresponding to some initial situation when customers
are unaware of the firm’s service rate information (and adopt balking threshold distribution N˜);
the last line of each table corresponds to the situation when the firm reveals the service rate
information to its customers (customers thus adopt balking threshold distribution N). All rows
in between the first and the last rows communicate the terms in the sequence in Construction 1.
The percentage change in a parameter (compared to the original beliefs N˜ , first line) is noted in
parenthesis.
Pessimistic Balking Thresholds: Assume that the true service rate is µ= 6 and the arrival rate
is λ= 5. Note that N = 9> E(N˜) = 7. Since µ≥ E(µ˜) + c
v−p = 5
2
3
, the customers have sufficiently
pessimistic service rate beliefs.
Balking Thresholds Firm Revenue Avg. Queue Length Avg. Waiting Time Consumer Welfare Social Welfare
Uninformed N˜ = N˜0 8.75 1.86 0.42 18.81 27.56
Construction:N˜1 8.87 (+1.41%) 1.94 (+4.32%) 0.44 (+2.87%) 18.86 (+0.26%) 27.73 (+0.62%)
N˜2 9.03 (+3.23%) 2.08 (+11.94%) 0.46 (+8.44%) 18.77 (-0.21%) 27.80 (+0.88%)
N˜3 9.17 (+4.88%) 2.24 (+20.47%) 0.49 (+14.86%) 18.57 (-1.28%) 27.75 (+0.68%)
N˜4 = N˜T 9.23 (+5.47%) 2.29 (+23.35%) 0.50 (+16.95%) 18.52 (-1.58%) 27.74 (+0.66%)
Informed N 9.52 (+8.83%) 2.84 (+52.78%) 0.60 (+40.38%) 17.21 (-8.52%) 26.73 (-3.01%)
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In this case, revealing the true service rate increases the firm’s revenue by 8.83% but also increases
the average queue length by 52.78% and the average waiting time by 40.38%. The firm thus benefits
from revealing its service rate information (in line with Proposition 1), but the increased benefit
is not sufficient to overcome the loss in consumer welfare (-8.52%). As a result, the overall social
welfare drops by 3.01%.
Consistent Balking Thresholds: Now assume that µ∈ [4 2
3
,5 1
3
) and λ= 4. Therefore, customers
have slightly pessimistic, slightly optimistic or possibly consistent service rate beliefs (i.e., |E(µ˜)−
µ|< c
v−p). However, N =E(N˜) = 7. Thus the resulting balking threshold distribution is consistent.
Balking Thresholds Firm Revenue Avg. Queue Length Avg. Waiting Time Consumer Welfare Social Welfare
Uninformed N˜ = N˜0 7.08 (+0.00%) 1.74 (+0.00%) 0.49 (+0.00%) 14.29 (+0.00%) 21.37 (+0.00%)
Construction N˜1 7.18 (+1.43%) 1.82 (+4.37%) 0.51 (+2.89%) 14.29 (+0.00%) 21.47 (+0.47%)
N˜2 7.31 (+3.24%) 1.95 (+11.89%) 0.53 (+8.37%) 14.15 (-0.97%) 21.46 (+0.43%)
N˜3 7.43 (+4.86%) 2.09 (+20.19%) 0.56 (+14.62%) 13.92 (-2.61%) 21.34 (-0.13%)
N˜4 = N˜T 7.47 (+5.46%) 2.14 (+23.12%) 0.57 (+16.75%) 13.84 (-3.15%) 21.31 (-0.30%)
Informed N = N˜T 7.47 (+5.46%) 2.14 (+23.12%) 0.57 (+16.75%) 13.84 (-3.15%) 21.31 (-0.30%)
In this example, revealing the true service rate still improves revenues (by 5.46%) in line with
Proposition 1. However, the average queue length and the average waiting time both increase
significantly (by 23.12% and 16.75% respectively). The firm benefits from revealing the service
rate, almost fully at the expense of consumer welfare (-3.15%), but the overall social welfare does
not fall significantly (-0.30%) due to the increase in throughput (i.e., number of customers served).
Optimistic Balking Thresholds: Finally, let µ= 4 and λ= 3. Note that N = 6<E(N˜) = 7 and
µ≤E(µ˜)− c
v−p = 4
1
3
(and hence, the population has sufficiently optimistic service rate beliefs).
Balking Thresholds Firm Revenue Avg. Queue Length Avg. Waiting Time Consumer Welfare Social Welfare
Uninformed N˜ = N˜0 5.40 (+0.00%) 1.57 (+0.00%) 0.58 (+0.00%) 9.93 (+0.00%) 15.33 (+0.00%)
Construction: N˜1 5.48 (+1.45%) 1.64 (+4.39%) 0.60 (+2.90%) 9.89 (-0.41%) 15.37 (+0.25%)
N˜2 5.58 (+3.22%) 1.75 (+11.65%) 0.63 (+8.17%) 9.72 (-2.11%) 15.30 (-0.23%)
N˜3 5.66 (+4.76%) 1.88 (+19.48%) 0.66 (+14.04%) 9.48 (-4.54%) 15.14 (-1.26%)
N˜4 = N˜T 5.69 (+5.34%) 1.92 (+22.37%) 0.68 (+16.16%) 9.39 (-5.43%) 15.08 (-1.64%)
Informed N 5.57 (+3.03%) 1.70 (+8.31%) 0.61 (+5.13%) 9.90 (-0.31%) 15.46 (-0.86%)
In this case, even though the customers are (incorrectly) optimistic about the service rate,
revealing the true service rate may still increase the firm’s revenue (by 3.03%). Examining the
second column of the table (firm’s revenue column) reveals that when customers’ optimistic balking
thresholds are more dispersed, it is beneficial for the firm to reveal service rate.
Observing further, we see that if customers’ balking threshold distribution is characterized by N˜
or N˜1, the firm increases its revenue from revealing the true service rate (whereas customers suffer
longer queues under full information). On the other hand, if customer thresholds are less dispersed,
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(for e.g., N˜3), the firm does not gain from revealing its service rate. However, customers would be
better off with the revealed information (through lower expected queue lengths and wait times).
In summary:
• Revenues generally improve with more information but welfare effects are mixed. The gains
in revenues are usually, but not always, lower than consumer welfare loss. Thus, social welfare can
reduce, as a consequence of more information in the system.
• When is it possible that both the firm revenues and consumer welfare improve upon service
information revelation? Such welfare improvements only occur when the traffic ρ is high and cus-
tomers’ initial beliefs are almost deterministic. One such example is given by Case (iii) of Numerical
Illustration 2 in §3.2 where λeff ↑ (R ↑) and L,W ↓.
5. Conclusions and Future Research.
Customers often join queues with very limited information. Most of the literature has assumed
that service parameters (specifically, service rate µ) that influence the joining behavior as common
knowledge. However, customers cannot always fully characterize these service parameters; some-
times even the calculation of mean service time may require repeated sampling or collection of
data. In such queues without information, not much is known on how revenues and welfare are
impacted, when a firm reveals its service information (specifically, service rate). Our paper seeks
to fill this gap.
Our approach to solving the information problem is distribution-free. Using our general but
intuitive approach, we calibrate the impact of information revelation on the performance of the
queueing system, without any restrictions on the distribution of the initial customer beliefs. We
can apply the results from our general model on belief structures that may emerge from specific
behaviors such as Quantal-response based bounded rationality (Luce (1959), Su (2008), Huang
et al. (2013)), out-of-queue learning through sampling from past experiences (Xu et al. 2007),
anecdotal reasoning (Huang and Chen 2014) and other cognitive biases to characterize their effects
on revenues and consumer welfare.
Insights and Implications: We find that the impact of service rate information on congestion
and welfare is mixed. Even though a firm’s revenue improves on announcing its service rate under
certain conditions (e.g., when the balking threshold distribution is pessimistic or consistent), the
congestion levels such as the average queue length or average wait time increase. As a result,
consumer welfare worsens with more information, despite the increased market coverage. In fact,
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consumer welfare loss can exceed revenue improvements at the firm. Thus, social welfare can fall
with provision of correct public information.
Hence, intriguingly, with informational uncertainty, social welfare typically improves in queues,
compared to when customers have full information. When left to their own devices, with full
information, more customers join a queue than what is socially optimal. In Naor (1969), tolls/taxes
are levied to control the joining population to improve welfare. Likewise, we find that lack of
information acts as an information tax that deters admission, which could lead to improved welfare.
The impact of additional information changes with the service capacity, given a market size.
Consumer welfare likely worsens in the case when a fast server reveals its service rate, compared
to the case when a slower server reveals its rate. Thus, customers are more likely to be worse off if
a faster firm with higher service capacity reveals its service information.
Our findings have several implications for queue management policies in practice. In primary
healthcare settings where the access to service providers is important, revealing the capacity infor-
mation can lead to an increased customer access to the queue (i.e., more customers will visit the
service provider). Nevertheless, customers will observe longer queues on average, and also suffer a
higher dis-utility in waiting time on average. Thus when there is a significant impetus on treating
admitted patients quickly, as in some emergency room settings, revealing the service information
may lead to increased crowding and worsen the average wait times. Furthermore, this effect is
exacerbated for a facility that has ample service capacity. So, the decision to reveal the service
information in aforementioned settings depends critically on the trade-offs between improved access
and increased congestion.
Further Considerations: Our model has some limitations and is amenable to further extensions.
We considered systems with λ< µ: The effect of information revelation to misinformed populations
in overloaded service systems is still open. We believe that much of our results of the first-order
stochastics continue to hold, but it appears that sequencing beliefs under higher stochastic orders is
more complex. Extensions to multiple server settings preserve our theoretical findings, and proofs
are available from the authors.
Price is exogenous in our model. An interesting key question would be to examine how a firm
would make joint decisions over price and service information revelation.
Research directions related to information and learning in queues appear promising. For instance,
it is unclear how consumers process limited information when the queue lengths are not visible,
or when others’ waiting costs may vary. In unobservable queue settings, every customer does not
only needs to use his own belief over the service parameters, but also needs to develop beliefs
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on other customers’ actions or beliefs, based on limited information. In such cases, the timing
of delay announcements (such as Allon et al. (2014)), or shading the information to be provided
play a critical role in customer decisions. Finally, our model has no reneging. In real settings,
customers may often accrue information and correct their beliefs as they wait in queues, leading to
abandonment behavior and future retrials. Such within-queue learning and rational abandonment
behaviors are fruitful directions of future research endeavors.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) By construction, the entire probability mass at one end of the distribution is transferred towards the
middle of the support. As a result, the range of the random variable N˜K+1 is a strict subset of the range of
N˜K . Specifically, a(K+1)1 = aK1 + 1 if fK(aK1)≤ fK(aKn) and a(K+1)N = aKN − 1 if fK(aK1)≥ fK(aKn). The
length of the range of N˜K , |aKn −aK1 |, is strictly decreasing in K. Within a finite number of steps, for some
time K = T , the length will be less than 2. When aTn − 1<aT1 + 1, the process stops. Thus, T is finite.
(ii) We show that FK+1 ≤SMPS FK . Let ai1 , ai2 , ai3 , ai4 in Definition 2 be aK1 , aK1 + 1, aKn − 1 and aKn
respectively. fK+1 = fK for all but these four points. Define γik = fK(aik)−fK+1(aik) for k= 1,2,3,4. Then,
γi1 =−γi2 =−γi3 = γi4 = min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}> 0. Moreover,
4∑
k=i
aikγik = [aK1 − (aK1 + 1)− (aKn − 1) +
aKn ] min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}= 0 ·min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}= 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Suppose that N˜T has two elements which are not consecutive. Then, it must be that aT1 + 1 < aTn . By
Construction 1, then sequence is not completed, which contradicts the definition of T . Else, suppose that N˜T
has three or more elements. Again, it must be that aT1 + 1< aTn , and hence, the sequence in Construction
1 is incomplete, which contradicts the definition of T . Therefore, N˜T can either take a single value or two
consecutive values. Case (i): When if E(N˜0) is an integer, since the transformation is mean preserving, we
have N˜T is a singleton with N˜T =E(N˜0) = bE(N˜0)c= dE(N˜0)e. Case (ii): When E(N˜0) is not an integer, N˜T
cannot be a singleton. Thus, N˜T takes on two consecutive values. Since the transformation in Construction
1 is mean-preserving with E(N˜0), we have E(N˜T ) = E(N˜0). Then we must have N˜T ∈ {bE(N˜0)c, dE(N˜0)e},
with Pr(N˜T = bE(N˜0)c)bE(N˜0)c+ Pr(N˜T = dE(N˜0)e)dE(N˜0)e= E(N˜0). It is also clear that the distribution
of N˜T is independent of the distribution of N˜0. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) For j ∈ {K,K + 1}, recall from (4) that RN˜j = pλeff,N˜j = pµ(1−pi0) where pi0 = 1/
(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯j(n)
)
.
It is thus sufficient to show that
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<
∞∑
i=1
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n). (7)
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To verify (7), our strategy is to form a partition of i ∈ {0,1,2, ...} based on the sign of ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n). We specifically focus on terms that make the product
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n), namely F¯K(n). Since
F¯K(n) = fK(n+ 1) + fK(n+ 2) + . . ., applying Construction 1, we have
F¯K+1(0) = F¯K(0) = 1,
F¯K+1(1) = F¯K(1) = 1,
...
F¯K+1(aK1 − 1) = F¯K(aK1 − 1) = 1,
F¯K+1(aK1) = F¯K(aK1) + min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)} ∈ (0,1],
F¯K+1(aK1 + 1) = F¯K(aK1 + 1) ∈ (0,1),
F¯K+1(aK1 + 2) = F¯K(aK1 + 2) ∈ (0,1),
...
F¯K+1(aKn − 2) = F¯K(aKn − 2) ∈ (0,1),
F¯K+1(aKn) = F¯K(aKn) = 0,
F¯K+1(aKn + 1) = F¯K(aKn + 1) = 0,
...
(8)
Thus, using transformation of N˜K to N˜K+1 in Construction 1, we see that F¯K(n) differs from F¯K+1(n) at
only two points, specifically n = aK1 and n = aKn − 1. In order to show (7), we verify, as an intermediate
step, that F¯K+1(aK1) · F¯K+1(aKn − 1)< F¯K(aK1) · F¯K(aKn − 1). We have
F¯K+1(aK1) · F¯K+1(aKn − 1) = [F¯K(aK1) + min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}][F¯K(aKn − 1)−min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}]
=F¯K(aK1)F¯K(aKn − 1) + min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}[F¯K(aKn − 1)− F¯K(aK1)−min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}]
<F¯K(aK1)F¯K(aKn − 1) since F¯K(aKn − 1)≤ F¯K(aK1). (9)
Now we define S1 , {1,2, . . . , aK1}; S2 , {aK1 + 1, aK1 + 2, . . . , aKn − 1}; S3 , {aKn}; and S4 , {aKn +
1, aKn + 2, . . .}. S1, S2, S3 and S4 then form a partition of the space {1,2,3, . . .}. Our goal (7) is equivalent
to
∑
i∈S1∪S2∪S3∪S4
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<
∑
i∈S1∪S2∪S3∪S4
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n).
From (8) and (9) we have ∀i ∈ S1 :
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) =
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n) = 1; ∀i ∈ S2 :
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n); ∀i ∈
S3 :
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)>
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n); and ∀i∈ S4 :
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) =
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n) = 0.
It is clear that S1 and S4 are collection of the indices i where
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) =
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n). Hence, to prove
(7), it suffices to show that
∑
i∈S2
⋃S3 ρ
i
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<
∑
i∈S2
⋃S3 ρ
i
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n). As ρ
i
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)< ρ
i
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
for all i∈ S2, the inequality will hold, if there exists some S2′ ⊆S2 such that
∑
i∈S2′∪S3
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<
∑
i∈S2′∪S3
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n). (10)
On the other hand, the existence of N˜K+1 guarantees that aKn − 1≥ aK1 + 1 and aK1 ≥ 1 so there exists
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at least one index in S2 (i.e., i = aK1 + 1). There is only one element in S3 (i.e., i = aKn). Let us define
S2′ , {aK1 + 1}. So S2′ ∪S3 = {aK1 + 1, aKn}. Inequality (10) is therefore equivalent to∑
i∈{aK1+1,aKn}
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<
∑
i∈{aK1+1,aKn}
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n),
⇔ ρaK1+1
aK1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) + ρ
aKn
aKn−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)<ρ
aK1+1
aK1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n) + ρ
aKn
aKn−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n).
And the last condition is true because
ρaKn
aKn−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)− ρaKn
aKn−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)<ρ
aKn min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
aKn−2∏
n=0
F¯K(n}
≤ρaKn min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}<ρaK1+1 min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
=ρaK1+1 min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}
aK1−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) = ρ
aK1+1
aK1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)− ρaK1+1
aK1∏
n=0
F¯K(n).
Therefore, inequality (10)-(7) all hold by backward induction, and λe,N˜K <λe,N˜K+1 (RN˜K <RN˜K+1).
(ii) Using definition of L from equation (3), we first show below that
LK <LK+1⇔
∑
i,j≥0:
∑
i>j
(i− j)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
(
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)−
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)
)
> 0, (11)
(which also provides an alternative approach to prove Theorem 1/(ii)):
LK+1 >LK⇔
∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
∞∑
i=0
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
>
∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
∞∑
i=0
ρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
⇔
∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
∞∑
j=0
ρj
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
>
∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
∞∑
j=0
ρj
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
,
⇔
[ ∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
][ ∞∑
j=0
ρj
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
]
>
[ ∞∑
i=0
iρi
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
][ ∞∑
j=0
ρj
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
]
,
⇔
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
iρi+j
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)>
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
iρi+j
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n),
⇔
∞∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
iρi+j
(
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
)
> 0,
⇔
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i6=j
iρi+j
(
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
)
> 0,
⇔
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i>j
iρi+j
(
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
)
+
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i<j
iρi+j
(
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
)
> 0,
⇔
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i>j
iρi+j
(
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
)
+
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i>j
jρi+j
(
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
)
> 0.
Regrouping again, gives∑
i,j>0:
∑
i>j
(
(i− j)ρi+j
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) + (j− i)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
)
>0,
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⇔
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i>j
(i− j)ρi+j
(
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)−
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
i−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
)
>0,
⇔
∑
i,j>0:
∑
i>j
(i− j)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
(
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)−
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)
)
>0.
Since, aKn is the largest value on the support of F¯K , we have F¯K+1(i− 1) = F¯K(i− 1) = 0 for i ∈ {aKn +
1, aKn + 2, . . .}. Hence, those indices can be dropped, which proves inequality (11):
LK <LK+1⇔
∑
aKn≥i>
∑
j≥0
(i− j)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
(
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)−
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)
)
> 0.
Let us define AK+1(i, j), (i− j)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n);
AK(i, j), (i− j)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n). (12)
Then (11) reduces to
∑
aKn≥i>
∑
j≥0
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0.
Similar to the approach used in the proof of part (i), our strategy is to form a partition of (i, j) based
on the sign of AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j). The underlying space is the 2-dimensional set {(i, j) : aKn ≥ i > j ≥ 0}.
Since AK+1(i, j) > AK(i, j) if and only if
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n) >
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n), we shall seek a partition over {(i, j) :
aKn ≥ i > j ≥ 0} based on the sign of
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)−
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n) instead.
Define G1 , {aKn}× {0,1,2, . . . , aKn − 1}; G2 , {aK1 + 1, aK1 + 2, ..., aKn − 2, aKn − 1}× {0,1,2, . . . , aK1};
and G3 , {(i, j) : aKn ≥ i > j ≥ 0}−{G1 ∪G2}, i.e., G3 contains all the elements that are not in G1 or G2.
From (8) and (9), we can verify that
∀(i, j)∈ G1 :
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)<
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)⇒AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)< 0;
∀(i, j)∈ G2 :
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)>
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)⇒AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)> 0;
∀(i, j)∈ G3 :
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n) =
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)⇒AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j) = 0.
Since G3 contains all (i, j) where AK+1(i, j) − AK(i, j) = 0, it suffices to just show that∑
(i,j)∈
∑
G1
⋃G2[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0 as a goal. Also since AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)> 0, ∀ (i, j)∈ G2, the inequality
will hold if there exists a subset G2′ ⊆G2 such that∑
(i,j)∈
∑
G1∪G2′
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0. (13)
We shall prove that the sufficient condition on ρ stated in the lemma guarantees for inequality (13) to
hold. To do that, we need to consider the elements of G1 and G2 in greater detail.
From the construction of the partition above, we have |G1| = aKn , i.e., there are aKn pairs of (i, j) in
G1, represented by {(aKn , aKn − 1), (aKn , aKn − 2), (aKn , aKn − 3), ..., (aKn ,1), (aKn ,0)}. On the other hand,
|G2|= (aKn −aK1 − 1)(aK1 + 1). Treating aKn −aK1 − 1 and aK1 + 1 as base and height of a rectangular and
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Order l G1 contains: G2′ contains:
l= 1 (aKn , aKn − 1) (aK1 +1, aK1 )
l= 2 (aKn , aKn − 2) (aK1 +1, aK1 − 1)
l= 3 (aKn , aKn − 3) (aK1 +1, aK1 − 2)
...
...
...
l= aK1 − 1 (aKn , aKn − aK1 +1) (aK1 +1,2)
l= aK1 (aKn , aKn − aK1 ) (aK1 +1,1)
l= aK1 +1 (aKn , aKn − aK1 − 1) (aK1 +1,0)
l= aK1 +2 (aKn , aKn − aK1 − 2) (aK1 +2,0)
l= aK1 +3 (aKn , aKn − aK1 − 3) (aK1 +3,0)
...
...
...
l= aKn − 2 (aKn ,2) (aKn − 2,0)
l= aKn − 1 (aKn ,1) (aKn − 1,0)
l= aKn (aKn ,0)
Table 3 G1 and G2′ used in the proof of Lemma 3/(ii)
Order l G1 contains: G2′ contains:
l= 1 (aKn , aKn − 1) (aK1 +1, aK1 )
l= 2 (aKn , aKn − 2) (aK1 +1, aK1 − 1)
l= 3 (aKn , aKn − 3) (aK1 +1, aK1 − 2)
...
...
...
l= aK1 − 1 (aKn , aKn − aK1 +1) (aK1 +1,2)
l= aK1 (aKn , aKn − aK1 ) (aK1 +1,1)
l= aK1 +1 (aKn , aKn − aK1 − 1) (aK1 +2,1)
l= aK1 +2 (aKn , aKn − aK1 − 2) (aK1 +3,1)
l= aK1 +3 (aKn , aKn − aK1 − 3) (aK1 +4,1)
...
...
...
l= aKn − 2 (aKn ,2) (aKn − 1,1)
l= aKn − 1 (aKn ,1)
Table 4 G1 and G2′ used in the proof of Lemma 3/(iii)
using the fact that a rectangular shape of fixed perimeter (aKn) contains less area (|G2|) when the shape is
more asymmetric, we can show that |G2| ≥ aKn −1, with equality holds only when aK1 = aKn −2 (or aK1 = 0
which is not possible).
The aKn−1 pairs of (i, j) that are guaranteed to reside in G2 can be parametrized as {(aK1 +1, aK1), (aK1 +
1, aK1−1), (aK1 +1, aK1−2), ..., (aK1 +1,1), (aK1 +1,0), (aK1 +2,0), (aK1 +3,0), ..., (aKn−2,0), (aKn−1,0)}.
We therefore define this set to be G2′ . Note that |G1|= aKn and |G2′ |= aKn − 1. We now order elements of
G1 and G2′ in a specific way displayed in Table 3 (each element in either group is itself an (i, j) pair).
We denote Gl1 : l ∈ {1,2, . . . , aKn} and Gl2′ : l ∈ {1,2, . . . , aKn−1} the l-th element in G1 and G2′ , respectively,
according to the order specified in Table 3. Furthermore, for each Gl1 and each Gl2′ , we specific its Cartesian
coordinates by subscript i and j, i.e., Gl1 = ({Gl1}i,{Gl1}j) and Gl2′ = ({Gl2′}i,{Gl2′}j). For example, {GaKn1 }i =
aKn and {G
aK1
2′ }j = 1. We note that ∀ l ∈ {1,2, . . . , aKn − 1},
{Gl1}i = aKn = (aKn − 1) + 1≥ {Gl2′}i + 1> {Gl2′}i (14)
{Gl1}i−{Gl1}j = l= {Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j (15)
{Gl1}i + {Gl1}j = aKn + {Gl1}j = 2aKn − l > 2(aKn − 1)− l≥ 2{Gl2′}i− l≥ {Gl2′}i + {Gl2′}j (16)
Recall from (13), our goal is to find a sufficient condition such that the summation of AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)
over all (i, j) in G1 ∪ G2′ is positive. We describe all the elements of G1 ∪ G2′ by considering the first
(aKn − 2) rows of Gl1 and Gl2′ in Table 3 plus the last three elements at the (aKn − 1)-th and the aKn-
th rows of the table (namely GaKn−11 , GaKn−12′ and GaKn1 ) from Table 3 . Therefore, one set of sufficient
conditions for (13) to hold is (a) ∀ l ∈ {1,2, . . . , aKn − 2},
∑
(i,j)∈{Gl1,Gl2′}
[AK+1(i, j) − AK(i, j)] > 0 and (b)∑
(i,j)∈{GaKn−11 ,G
aKn
−1
2′ ,G
aKn
1 }
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0.
We first show that (a) is true for all ρ. ∀ l ∈ {1,2, . . . , aKn−2}. Recall that [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)] evaluated
at (i, j) = Gl1 is negative, and [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)] evaluated at (i, j) = Gl2′ is positive. It is thus equivalent
to show that [AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=Gl1
< [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=Gl
2′
.
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Denote d= min{fK(aK1), fK(aKn)}> 0, we have from (12) that
[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=Gl1
= ({Gl1}i−{Gl1}j)ρ{G
l
1}i+{Gl1}j
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
{Gl1}i−1∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K(n)−
{Gl1}i−1∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K+1(n)

= (aKn −{Gl1}j)ρaKn+{G
l
1}j
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
 aKn−1∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K(n)−
aKn−1∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K+1(n)

= l · ρaKn+{Gl1}j
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
 aKn−1∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K(n)−
aKn−1∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K+1(n)

< l · ρaKn+{Gl1}j
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
d · aKn−2∏
n={Gl1}j
F¯K(n)

= l · d · ρaKn+{Gl1}j
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
aKn−2∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
< ({Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j) · d · ρ{G
l
2′}i+{G
l
2′}j
{Gl1}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
aKn−2∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
because l= {Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j see (15), ρ< 1 and aKn + {Gl1}j > {Gl2′}i + {Gl2′}j see (16)
≤ ({Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j) · d · ρ{G
l
2′}i+{G
l
2′}j
aKn−2∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
≤ ({Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j) · d · ρ{G
l
2′}i+{G
l
2′}j
{Gl
2′}i−1∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n) because aKn − 2≥ {Gl2′}i− 1 see (14)
= ({Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j)ρ{G
l
2′}i+{G
l
2′}j
{Gl
2′}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl
2′}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
d · {Gl2′}i−1∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n)

because
{Gl
2′}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl
2′}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n) = 1
= ({Gl2′}i−{Gl2′}j)ρ{G
l
2′}i+{G
l
2′}j
{Gl
2′}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
{Gl
2′}j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
{Gl2′}i−1∏
n={Gl
2′}j
F¯K+1(n)−
{Gl
2′}i−1∏
n={Gl
2′}j
F¯K(n)

because
aK1−1∏
n={Gl
2′}j
F¯K+1(n) =
aK1−1∏
n={Gl
2′}j
F¯K(n) = 1, F¯K+1(aK1)− F¯K(aK1) = d
and F¯K+1(x) = F¯K(x), ∀x∈ {aK1 + 1, . . . ,{Gl2′}i− 1}
= [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=Gl
2′
, as required.
Next, for (b) to hold, i.e.,
∑
(i,j)∈{GaKn−11 ,G
aKn
2′ ,G
aKn
1 }
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0, we have equivalently:
[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=GaKn−11
+[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=GaKn1
< [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=GaKn−1
2′
⇔
[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn ,1)
+[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn ,0)
< [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn−1,0)
(17)
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Note that (with any empty product being equal to = 1)
[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn ,1)
= (aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 ·
(
aKn−1∏
n=1
F¯K+1(n)−
aKn−1∏
n=1
F¯K(n)
)
< (aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n),
[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn ,0)
= aKnρ
aKn ·
(
aKn−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)−
aKn−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
)
<aKnρ
aKn · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n),
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn−1,0)
= (aKn − 1)ρaKn−1 ·
(
aKn−2∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)−
aKn−2∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
)
= (aKn − 1)ρaKn−1 ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1
F¯K+1(n)−
aKn−2∏
n=aK1
F¯K(n)
= (aKn − 1)ρaKn−1 · d · aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n).
Therefore, it is sufficient for (17) to hold if
(aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n) + aKnρ
aKn · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n)≤ (aKn − 1)ρaKn−1 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n)
⇔ (aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 + aKnρaKn ≤ (aKn − 1)ρaKn−1⇔ ρ2 +
aKn
aKn − 1
ρ≤ 1. (18)
Solving quadratic equation (18) gives the condition
1
2
(
−
√
(
aKn
aKn − 1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn − 1
)
≤ ρ≤ 1
2
(√
(
aKn
aKn − 1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn − 1
)
.
where it is clear that 1
2
(
−
√
(
aKn
aKn−1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn−1
)
< 0 and 0< 1
2
(√
(
aKn
aKn−1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn−1
)
< 1.
Since ρ∈ (0,1), we conclude that, when ρ≤ 1
2
(√
(
aKn
aKn−1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn−1
)
, (18) (17),(13) and (11) all hold
and thus it is a sufficient condition for LN˜K <LN˜K+1 . This completes the proof of part (ii).
(iii) Using the definition of W from equation (6), and comparing the structure of equation (3) to that of (6),
it can be shown via a similar approach used in the proof of inequality (11) that
WN˜K <WN˜K+1⇔
∑
i,j≥1:
∑
i>j
(i− j)ρi+j
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K+1(n)
j−1∏
n=0
F¯K(n)
(
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K+1(n)−
i−1∏
n=j
F¯K(n)
)
> 0, (19)
which also provides an alternative approach to prove Theorem 1/(iii). Using the same definition of AK(i, j)
and AK+1(i, j) from part (ii), we have WN˜K <WN˜K+1 ⇔
∑
aKn≥i>
∑
j≥1
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)] > 0. The rest of
the proof is then almost identical to the proof of part (ii) except now i, j cannot take on 0. Define G1 ,
{aKn} × {1,2, . . . , aKn − 1}, G2 , {aK1 + 1, aK1 + 2, ..., aKn − 2, aKn − 1} × {1,2, . . . , aK1}, and G3 , {(i, j) :
aKn ≥ i > j ≥ 1}−{G1 ∪G2}.
There are now at least aKn − 2 elements in the set G2 which defines the subset G2′ . The elements in
G1 and G2′ are ordered in a similar fashion as before and displayed in Table 4. A sufficient condition for
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WN˜K <WN˜K+1 from (19) is that
∑
(i,j)∈G1∪G2′
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0. It can be shown that conditions (14)-
(16) still hold, and thus ∀ l ∈ {1,2, . . . , aKn−3} and for all ρ,
∑
(i,j)∈{Gl1,Gl2′}
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0. Therefore,
a sufficient condition for WN˜K <WN˜K+1 is that∑
(i,j)∈{GaKn−21 ,G
aKn
−2
2′ ,G
aKn
−1
1 }
[AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]> 0. (20)
Since [AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn ,2)
< (aKn − 2)ρaKn+2 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n),
[AK(i, j)−AK+1(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn ,1)
< (aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n),
and [AK+1(i, j)−AK(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣
(i,j)=(aKn−1,1)
= (aKn − 2)ρaKn · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n),
condition (20) will hold if
(aKn − 2)ρaKn+2 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n) + (aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n)≤ (aKn − 2)ρaKn · d ·
aKn−2∏
n=aK1+1
F¯K(n)
⇔ (aKn − 2)ρaKn+2 + (aKn − 1)ρaKn+1 ≤ (aKn − 2)ρaKn ⇔ ρ2 +
aKn − 1
aKn − 2
ρ≤ 1.
The solution of the quadratic inequality on the set ρ∈ (0,1) is ρ≤ 1
2
(√
(
aKn−1
aKn−2
)2 + 4− aKn−1
aKn−2
)
. 
Proof of Theorem 2:
(i) Result follows immediately from Lemma 3/(i) since λeff,N˜K <λeff,N˜K+1 (RN˜K <RN˜K+1) for all K.
(ii) Recall from Lemma 3/(ii) that LN˜K <LN˜K+1 if ρ≤ 12
(√
(
aKn
aKn−1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn−1
)
. It can be easily verified
that 1
2
(√
(
aKn
aKn−1
)2 + 4− aKn
aKn−1
)
increases in aKn . Plugging in the smallest possible value of aKn which
is 3, we get ρ = 0.5. Therefore, when ρ ≤ 0.5, LN˜K < LN˜K+1 for all K (regardless of the distributions of
{N˜K}K=0,1,2,...,T ). Result thus follows. Note it is possible to derive stronger distribution-specific conditions.
(iii) Recall from Lemma 3/(iii) that WN˜K <WN˜K+1 if ρ ≤ 12
(√
(
aKn−1
aKn−2
)2 + 4− aKn−1
aKn−2
)
. It can be verified
that 1
2
(√
(
aKn−1
aKn−2
)2 + 4− aKn−1
aKn−2
)
increases in aKn . Plugging in the smallest possible value of aKn which is
3, we get ρ = 0.414. Therefore, when ρ≤ 0.414, WN˜K <WN˜K+1 for all K. Result thus follows. Again, it is
possible to derive stronger distribution-specific conditions. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider the random variable N˜T ∈ {bE(N˜)c, dE(N˜)e} such that E(N˜T ) = E(N˜). By Theorem 2, we have
RN˜ ≤RN˜T for all ρ, and LN˜ ≤ LN˜T , WN˜ ≤WN˜T for small ρ. On the other hand, since E (N˜)≤N and N is
an integer, we must have dE(N˜)e ≤N . It follows that N˜T ≤st N so by Theorem 1, we have RN˜T ≤RN for all
ρ, and LN˜T ≤LN , WN˜T ≤WN for small ρ. Result thus follows. 
Proof of Lemma 4
From the properties of a floor function, we know that µ(v−p)
c
− 1<N = bµ(v−p)
c
c ≤ µ(v−p)
c
, and µ˜(v−p)
c
− 1<
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N˜ = b µ˜(v−p)
c
c ≤ µ˜(v−p)
c
for every realization ⇒ E(µ˜)(v−p)
c
− 1 < E(N˜) ≤ E(µ˜)(v−p)
c
. (i) When E(µ˜) ≤ µ− c
v−p ,
E(N˜) ≤ µ(v−p)
c
− 1 < N . (ii) When E(µ˜) ≥ µ + c
v−p , E(N˜) >
µ(v−p)
c
≥ N . (iii) When |E(µ˜) − µ| < x · c
v−p
for some x ∈ (0,1], we will discuss three sub-cases: (a) If E(µ) = µ, then µ(v−p)
c
− 1 < E(N˜) ≤ µ(v−p)
c
and
|E(N˜)−N |< 1; (b) If µ<E(µ)<µ+x · c
v−p , then
µ(v−p)
c
− 1< E(µ˜)(v−p)
c
− 1<E(N˜)≤ E(µ˜)(v−p)
c
< µ(v−p)
c
+x
and |E(N˜)−N |< 1+x; (c) If µ−x · c
v−p <E(µ)<µ, then
µ(v−p)
c
−x−1< E(µ˜)(v−p)
c
−1<E(N˜)≤ E(µ˜)(v−p)
c
<
µ(v−p)
c
and |E(N˜)−N |< 1 +x. Combining the three sub-cases, it is easy to see that |E(N˜)−N |< 1 +x. 
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